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NOTE
THE PERFECT STORM: WEATHERING PUERTO
RICO'S FISCAL CRISIS IN THE WAKE OF
HURRICANE MARIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The depths of Puerto Rico's current crisis extend beyond the
Island's obliterated power grid, food insecurity, and ravaged roads.'
With a forty-five percent poverty rate, insolvent public pensions, and a
shrinking population, Puerto Rico is in financial crisis mode. 2 In addition
to the economic and fiscal crisis, Puerto Rico is confronting a massive
humanitarian disaster.3 On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria
slammed into the Island and became the most destructive storm to hit
Puerto Rico in almost ninety years.' With 155 mile per hour winds,
Hurricane Maria knocked out all electric power, destroyed more than
100,000 homes, and ruptured bridges and other public infrastructure.s
The Category Four storm was so wide-300 miles-that it covered the
Island in its entirety and dropped over two feet of rain.6 Following
Maria's wrath, the Island has faced an ongoing shortage of food, water,
electricity, and medical services, with little signs of improvement.'

1. Lauren Lluveras, Puerto Rico's Bankruptcy Will Make HurricaneRecovery Even Harder,
WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https//www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/09/

27/puerto-ricos-bankruptcy-will-make-hurricane-recovery-even-harder/utmterm=.87688915d935.
2. Stephanie Kelly, Hedge Funds Disclose Their Puerto Rico Debt Holdings, REUTERS (July
26, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/puertorico-debt/hedge-funds-disclose-their-puerto-ricodebt-holdings-idUSL1N1KHIFC.
3. Id.; Lluveras, supra note 1.
4. Rating Action: Moody's Downgrades Puerto Rico GOs, COFINA and Other Debt
After Hurricane Maria; Outlook Negative, MOODY'S INVEST. SERV. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Downgrades-Puerto-Rico-GOs-COFINA-and-OtherDebt-After--PR 904269952.
5. Catesby Holmes, Puerto Rico Two Months After Maria: 5 Essential Reads,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 19, 2017), http://theconversation.com/puerto-rico-two-months-after-maria-5essential-reads-87409.
6. Id
7. Id.
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While Hurricane Maria escalated the Island's financial troubles,
Puerto Rico's current fiscal state is derived from a multitude of sources.'
The continuing population decline, overextension of municipal bonds,
and oppressive social spending have forced the Island to seek assistance
from the U.S. government to help relieve the Island of its pressing $70
billion debt.9 Unable to seek relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
Puerto Rico has been undergoing a restructuring effort under the newly
promulgated Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act ("PROMESA").1 o
Amidst the legal and political uncertainty of PROMESA and the
catastrophic effects of Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico's municipalities are
currently attempting to restructure their immense sovereign debts while
simultaneously attempting to recover from the catastrophic storm that
destroyed thousands of businesses and homes." This Note analyzes the
various economic issues currently plaguing Puerto Rico, as well as the
compounding ramifications as a result of Hurricane Maria.' 2 Part II
presents a brief history of Puerto Rico and the economic backdrop that
has led the Island into its financial crisis.13 Part m analyzes PROMESA
and why the legislation was created as an alternative to Chapter 9 relief
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.14 Part III also breaks down the major
features of Puerto Rico's restructuring process under Title III of
PROMESA including its various sources of debt types, main creditors,
and current litigation." Furthermore, Part III details the compounding
economic effects as a result of Hurricane Maria.1 6 Part IV discusses
possible solutions to Puerto Rico's longstanding fiscal problems that
have plagued the Island for decades." This Part offers suggestions that
can help afford Puerto Rico independent financial standing by amending
PROMESA and offering new tax initiatives that will simultaneously
incentivize local and corporate growth on the Island." Finally, this Note
8. Heather Long, Puerto Rico's Crisis: How Did It Get So Bad?, CNN: MONEY (May 12,
2016, 12:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/investing/puerto-rico-debt-crisis/index.html.
9. Id.
10. Andr6s L. C6rdova, PROMESA and Puerto Rico's Political Future, HILL (July 14,
2017, 8:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/341949-promesa-and-puerto-ricospolitical-future; see also Steven Mufson, Shaky Puerto Rican Dam Has Gone UninspectedSince
2013, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2017, at A6.
11. C6rdova, supranote 10.
12. See infra Parts II-IV.
13.

See infra Part II.

14.
15.
16.

See infra Part 11.
See infra Part lf.C.
See infra Part UI.D.

17.
18.

See infra PartIV.
See infra PartIV.
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concludes by discussing why Puerto Rico's financial restructuring and
pressing humanitarian issues are so significant.19
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO

A.

Puerto Rico's ConstitutionalStatus

The United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines
from Spain via the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1898.20 Puerto Rico is a
U.S. territory subject to congressional authority derived from the
Territory Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2 1 The Territory Clause
grants Congress the "[p]ower to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." 22 While the Jones Act of 1917 granted U.S.
citizenship to Puerto Ricans, Puerto Ricans are not afforded the same
protections as U.S. citizens residing in the States.23 Namely, Puerto
Ricans lack voting representation in Congress and the ability to vote in
presidential elections.24
Puerto Rico has historically struggled to maintain a strong and
independent economy and has depended on U.S. tax breaks to
incentivize business growth.25 The U.S. federal government has
attempted to encourage business development in Puerto Rico on multiple
occasions by offering corporate tax exemptions.26 Implemented in 1976,
section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code provided significant incentives
for U.S. corporations to locate subsidiaries on the Island by allowing a
subsidiary "more [than] 80% owned by a foreign entity to deduct 100%

19. See infra Part V.
20. R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO
RICo: BRIEF BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2017). The weight of
importance of Puerto Rico's status as a territory is often heavily debated among scholars. Id. at 3-4.
Some believe that the debate of Puerto Rico's statehood status is a distraction from the longstanding
issues plaguing the Island. Id. Others, however, believe that the Island's distinction from statehood
status is the foundation from which most of the Island's financial issues can be traced back to. Id
While it is important to note the legal significance of Puerto Rico as a territory or commonwealth,
the debate regarding the future statehood of Puerto Rico is outside the scope of this Note. Id
21. Id. at 4.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
23. Perry T. Graham, Municipal Bankruptcy in "the Oldest Colony in the World" After Puerto
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and PROMESA, 63 LOY. L. REV. 179, 186 (2017).
24. Id.
25. Scott Greenberg & Gavin Ekins, Tax Policy Helped Create Puerto Rico's Fiscal Crisis,
TAX FOUND. (June 30, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/tax-policy-helped-create-puerto-rico-sfiscal-crisis.
26. Id
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of the dividends paid to its parent."27 Subsidiaries in Puerto Rico,
therefore, paid no corporate income tax as long as their profits were
distributed as dividends.28 As a result of "these generous tax incentives
for businesses, Puerto Rico grew rapidly throughout the twentieth
century and developed a substantial manufacturing sector, though it
remained relatively poor compared to the U.S. mainland.29
In 2006, Congress allowed for the tax incentives for corporate
operations to expire as many individuals viewed these incentives as a
way to avoid taxes, referring to the law as "the mother of all tax
shelters."30 The expiration of these benefits has troubled the Island's job
market as businesses elected to discontinue their presence in Puerto
Rico." With businesses leaving the Island, Puerto Rico's residents have
followed in increasing numbers.3 2 Since 2005, Puerto Rico has lost
roughly ten percent of the population.33 Making matters worse, Puerto
Rico has an extremely low labor participation rate, with only forty
percent of the adult population employed or looking for work.34 As the
population shrinks below 3.5 million, the reduction of its tax base
heightens the Island's revenue crisis.3

5

B. Issuance ofBonds andResulting Debt
In 1917, Congress allowed the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico "to
issue municipal bonds tax-free from all U.S. federal, state and local
governments." 36 The interest derived on most municipal bonds is subject
to taxes by various levels of government.3 7 Therefore, the triple tax-

2 7. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30.

Id; see Nick Brown, How Dependence on CorporateTax Breaks CorrodedPuerto Rico's

Economy, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-puertorico-economy.

31.

Greenberg & Ekins, supra note 25.

32.

Nick Timiraos, Puerto Rico's Drastic Population Loss Deepens Its Economic Crisis,

WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016, 7:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-ricos-drasticpopulation-loss-deepens-its-economic-crisis-1467219467.
33. Id.
34. ANNE 0. KRUEGER, RANJIT TEJA & ANDREW WOLFE, PUERTO Rico - A WAY FORWARD
6(2015).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Bradley Wendt, Puerto Rico FiscalReform: The End of the Beginning, LAW360 (June 14,
2017, 1:01 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/934550/puerto-rico-fiscal-reform-the-end-of-thebeginning.
37. Greg DePersio, The Origins of the Puerto Rican Debt Crisis, INVESTOPEDIA (May 31,
2017, 8:42 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/090915/origins-puerto-rican-debtcrisis.asp.
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exempt status made Puerto Rico's bonds highly appealing to U.S.
investors at a very low cost for the Commonwealth.38
Puerto Rico has had a history of questionable budget balancing
procedures.39 Whereas many state constitutions provide "strict [and]
explicit balanced budget requirements to ensure that expenditures in a
fiscal year are within the cash available for that fiscal year," the Puerto
Rican Constitution does not confer strict requirements on its
municipalities to produce balanced budgets.40 In 1952, Congress
approved Puerto Rico's new Constitution that relaxed balanced budget
requirements. 4 1 However, Congress's approval to loosen Puerto Rico's
borrowing capacity was less based in policy and more of a translation
issue.42 The 1952 Puerto Rico Constitution was passed in English.43
Specifically, the English version stated: "appropriations made for any
fiscal year shall not exceed the total revenues, including available
surplus, estimated for said fiscal year unless the imposition of taxes
sufficient to cover said appropriations is provided by law."" However,
in the Spanish text, the English term "total revenues" was translated as
"recursos totales."45 Lacking a direct translation, the phrase "recursos
totales" was argued by Puerto Rican delegates to mean "total resources";
a concept broader than simply "revenues."' The broader interpretation
"included revenues from taxation, surpluses, royalties, federal
assistance, and, most importantly, funds obtained through the sale
of bonds." 47
A subsequent constitutional amendment in 1961 loosened the reins
of debt capacity.4 8 In 1961, Congress amended the Puerto Rico Federal
Relations Act to remove the federally imposed debt limit based on
assessed valuation. 4 9 Prior to the amendment, "[m]unicipalities were
allowed to borrow between 5 and 10 percent of assessed value on their
own, without including commonwealth debt in the calculation."so
38.

See Wendt, supranote 36.

39.

See id.

40. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATUREs, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED
BUDGET PROVISIONS 2-5 (2010).
41. MARC D. JOFFE & JESSE MARTINEZ, ORIGINS OF THE PUERTO Rico FISCAL CRISIS 8

(2016).
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id at 10-11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.

46.

Id. (statement of Delegate Negr6n L6pez).

47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.

50.

Id. at 13.
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Following the amendment, the Commonwealth no longer had a debt
limit based on assessed valuation and instead "the amendment imposed a
15 percent ceiling on debt service (principal and interest payments) as a
percentage of tax revenues."s" The borrowing limit only applied to
"bonds or notes for the payment of which the full faith credit and taxing
power of the Commonwealth shall be pledged" and therefore did not
apply to bonds backed by a single tax.52 Ultimately, the Puerto Rican
government utilized this amendment to create a loophole by forming
Corporaci6ndel Fondo de Interds Apremiante ("COFINA"), an entity
that issues bonds backed exclusively by the Commonwealth's sales tax
revenues and which are not included in the debt limit."
The broader interpretation of "revenues," coinciding with the
relaxed debt capacities, allowed debt proceeds to be used as a tool to
balance the budget, which allowed for recurring operating deficits. 54 The
loosening, in turn, encouraged Puerto Rico to fund fiscal shortfalls
through the issuance of the triple-exempt municipal bonds." Puerto Rico
issued extensive bond debt and began relying on borrowed funds from
the bond issuance to balance its budget and not actual revenue. 6 This
practice led to a widening budget deficit." Puerto Rico's debt represents
nearly seventy percent of the territory's gross domestic product."
Comparatively, states in the U.S. only have a seventeen percent debt-toGDP ratio on average. 9
Aside from taxes on the sale of bonds, Puerto Rico also has a major
issue collecting taxes.' A 2015 study by KPMG reported that Puerto
Rico collects just fifty-six percent of the sales taxes due." Although
Puerto Rico has attempted to tackle tax evasion by passing legislation
requiring merchants to take other payment forms in addition to cash,
professional offices such as doctors continue to charge on a cash only
basis in an effort to avoid taxes and post signs that read: "No Checks, No
Credit Cards, No ATM Cards. Just Cash."62
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. DePersio, supra note 37.
59. Id.
60. Greg Allen & Marisa Pefialoza, In Puerto Rico's Debt Crisis, There Are No Easy
Solutions, NPR (May 5, 2015, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/05/05/403290738/in-puertoricos-debt-crisis-there-are-no-easy-solutions.
61. Id
62. Id.
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As a result of the Commonwealth's escalating debt, three major
credit rating agencies downgraded Puerto Rico's debt to junk status in
2014.6 This poor investment grade status triggered acceleration clauses
in contracts with many of the territory's creditors.' With principal and
interest payments due sooner than expected, Puerto Rico's revenues
proved insufficient to pay the obligations." The Commonwealth's
$74 billion debt consists of $17.8 billion of general obligation and
Commonwealth-guaranteed bonds, $17.6 billion of COFINA bonds,
$9 billion in Puerto Rico's Electric Power Authority ("PREPA"),
$52.2 billion of pension-related debt owed to current and future retirees,
and $20.8 billion of other related debt, including debt of the Government
Development Bank, the water utility and highway agency, and the
University of Puerto Rico. 66 As of October 2017, the Commonwealth
has a pension liability of $49 billion owed to current and
future retirees. 67
C.

Attempted Economic Legislation

After the tax breaks expired for mainland U.S. manufacturers in
2006, Puerto Rico attempted to combat its plagued economy
through legislation meant to incentivize business growth. 8 In 2008,
Puerto Rico passed the Economic Incentives for the Development of
Puerto Rico Act ("EIA").6 9 The EIA provided tax credits and incentives
designed to encourage the establishment and development of various
enterprises, including manufacturing, commercial business, and Internetbased operations. 70
In 2012, Puerto Rico enacted further initiatives to promote the
exportation of services by providing attractive tax incentives for
companies that establish and expand their export service businesses in
the Island, which included a 4% corporate tax rate, 100% tax exemption
on dividends or profit distributions, and 100% exemption on property
taxes.n Furthermore, Act No. 22 of 2012 sought to "attract new
63. See DePersio, supra note 37.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66.

Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, BLOOMBERG NEWS,

https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-puerto-rico-debt-crisis (last updated Oct. 4, 2017).
67. Id.
68.

PuertoRico Tax Incentives, SOTHEBY'S INT'L REALTY, http://puertoricotaxincentives.com

(last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
69. See Economic Incentives Act for the Developlment of Puerto Rico, 2008 P.R. Laws No.
73; Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, supra note 68.
70. PuertoRico Tax Incentives, supra note 68.

71.

Id
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residents to Puerto Rico by providing a total exemption from Puerto
Rico income taxes on all passive income realized or accrued after such
individuals become bona fide residents of Puerto Rico." 72 This
relocation exemption sought to accelerate the Island's economy by
increasing investments in real estate services, and other consumption
products, and in capital injections.
The tax legislation, however, proved to be insufficient to
incentivize business growth in the long term as businesses continue to
retreat out of Puerto Rico. 74 Rather, the legislation reflects Puerto Rico's
longstanding economic policies, which have tended to favor outside
corporations over local businesses.75 Critics have argued that the
continued tax breaks only promote an artificial economic stability and
reflect Puerto Rico's historical dependence on mainland corporations.76
III.

FISCAL RESTRUCTURING UNDER PROMESA AND THE
EFFECT OF HURRICANE MARIA

Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") offers
protections to a financially distressed municipality "from its creditors
while it develops and negotiates a plan for adjusting its debts.""
Reorganization of the debts of a municipality is generally "accomplished
either by extending debt maturities, reducing the amount of principal or
interest, or refinancing the debt by obtaining a new loan."7 ' Although
there are some similarities to other chapters of the Code, Chapter 9 is
vastly different in some respects. Under Chapter 9, "there is no
provision in the law for liquidation of the assets of the municipality and
distribution of the proceeds to creditors" in that "such a liquidation or
dissolution would undoubtedly violate the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution and the reservation to the states of sovereignty over their
internal affairs."so Furthermore, the functions of the bankruptcy
court in Chapter 9 cases are usually limited "to approving the
petition,. . . confirming

a plan of debt adjustment,

and ensuring

implementation of the plan. "81
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
See Brown, supranote 30.
Id
Id.
Chapter 9 - Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forns/

bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-9-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
7 8.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
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Although Puerto Rico was originally expressly eligible for relief
under Chapter 9 of the Code, Congress amended the Code in 1984
without comment, barring Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia
from authorizing their municipalities to access Chapter 9.82 Ineligible for
relief under the Code, in 2014 Puerto Rico responded to the ongoing
fiscal crisis by enacting the Puerto Rico Corporation Debt Enforcement
and Recovery Act (the "Act").83 The Act enabled Puerto Rico's public
utility companies to implement a restructuring plan for its debt.84 In
2016, however, the Supreme Court decided that the Code preempted the
Act." This preemption prompted the creation of PROMESA by
Congress; the vehicle that Puerto Rico is currently utilizing to restructure
its massive debt."
Subpart A discusses the federal preemption that led to the creation
of PROMESA.1 7 Subpart B describes the major characteristics of
PROMESA." Subpart C outlines the ongoing proceedings of current
municipalities adjusting their debts under Title III of PROMESA by
describing the various kinds of debt and creditors." Finally, Subpart D
details the devastating effect that Hurricane Maria has had on the Island
as well as its compounding economic effects on the ongoing
restructuring process."
A.

Puerto Rico's Status as a "State "for Purposesof the Code

In 2016, the Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of the Code
in Puerto Rico.9 1 Here, a group of bondholders holding $2 billion in
PREPA bonds sought to enjoin the application of the Act, arguing, inter
alia, that while Puerto Rico should not fall within the definition of a
"State" under the Code's "gateway" provision, Puerto Rico could be
considered a "State" for section 903(1) of the Code.92 Section 903(1) of
the Code preempts a state from enacting its own bankruptcy laws that
enable insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the
objections of creditors, and instead requires municipalities to restructure
82.

11 U.S.C.

§

101(52) (2012); Adam Liptak & Mary Williams Walsh, Justices Reject

Puerto Rico in Case on RestructuringDebt, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2016, at B3.

83. Liptak & Walsh, supranote 82.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See infra Part lI.A.
88. See infra Part W.B.
89. See infra Part 11.C.
90. See infra Part M.D.
91. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
92. Id. at 1943, 1946.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 11

1076

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 46:1067

their debts under Chapter 9.19 Section 109(c) of the Code, often referred
to as the "gateway" provision, defines the definition of "Debtor" for
purposes of who may be authorized to seek relief under Chapter 9 of
the Code.94
The Court agreed with the bondholders and found that the Puerto
Rico Recovery Act was preempted by section 903(1).11 The Supreme
Court found that while Puerto Rico was ineligible for relief under the
Code in that Puerto Rico is not a "State" for purposes of the Code's
"gateway" provision, Puerto Rico is considered a "State" for purposes of
the Code's preemption provision.9 6 The Court stated that the "amended
definition of 'State' excludes Puerto Rico for the single 'purpose of
defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9' and that it therefore
"interpret Congress' use of the 'who may be a debtor' language in the
amended definition of 'State' to mean that Congress intended to exclude
Puerto Rico from this gateway provision delineating who may be a
debtor under Chapter 9."97 The Court reasoned, however, that
Puerto Rico is no less bound by the pre-emption provision even though
Congress has removed its authority to provide authorization for its
municipalities to file Chapter 9 petitions [in that] if it were Congress'
intent to also exclude Puerto Rico as a "State" for purposes of that preemption provision, it would have said so.98
Further, the fact "[t]hat Puerto Rico is not a 'State' for purposes of the
gateway provision, however, says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is

93. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) ("This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to
control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political
or governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but--(1) a
State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind
any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and (2) a judgment entered under such a law
may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.").
94. Id. § 109(c) ("An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such
entity-(1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by
name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization
empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter; (3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and (5)(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors
holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair
under a plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has
failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of
each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (C) is unable
to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D) reasonably believes that
a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this title.").
95. PuertoRico, 136 S. Ct. at 1949.
96. Id. at 1947.
97. Id at 1946.
98. Id. at 1948.
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a 'State' for the other provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States," and
therefore the Act was preempted by Code section 903(1).99
In the 5-2 opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that the decision was
compelled by a straightforward reading of the federal law, which "bars
Puerto Rico from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to
restructure the debt of its insolvent public utilities companies.""o In
dissent, however, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the majority's
approach was too mechanical, and failed to take into account the purpose
of the bankruptcy law and the impact of its decision. 101 By preempting
the Restructuring Act, Sotomayor argued that the Court ignored the
realities of Puerto Rico's crisis as it takes away "the only existing legal
option for Puerto Rico to restructure debts that could cripple
its citizens."102

B.

Enactment of PROMESA

Shortly following the Supreme Court's ruling, in June 2016
Congress quickly enacted legislation to respond to Puerto Rico's
ongoing economic crisis.' 03 PROMESA established a process for
restructuring Puerto Rico's public debt.'" Title III of PROMIESA, like
the Code, includes a provision for a plan of adjustment to be proposed
by the debtor, voted on by creditors and confirmed by the court.'
United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain, for the Southern
District of New York, was designated by Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Roberts to preside under the Title III cases pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.106
99. Id. at 1947.
100. Id. at 1942.
101. Id. at 1953-54 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
102. Id at 1949-50. Justice Sotomayor went on to foreshadow the electrical blackouts by
describing the importance of the particular debt stating:
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its municipalities are in the middle of a fiscal
crisis. The combined debt of Puerto Rico's three main public utilities exceeds $20
billion. These utilities provide power, water, sewer, and transportation to residents of the
Island. With rising interest rates and limited access to capital markets, their debts are
proving unserviceable. Soon, Puerto Rico and the utilities contend, they will be unable to
pay for things like fuel to generate electricity, which will lead to rolling blackouts. Other
vital public services will be imperiled, including the utilities' ability to provide safe
drinking water, maintain roads and operate public transportation.
Id.
103. See GARRETT, supra note 20, at 16.
104. Id.
105.

D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R44532, THE PUERTO RICO OVERSIGHT,

MANAGEMENT, AND EcoNoMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA, H.R. 5278, S. 2328) 4 (2016).
106. Cate Long, Developing: PuertoRico Enters Bankruptcy on May 3, 36 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 12, 86 (2017).
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Modeled after Chapter 9 of the Code, PROMESA creates a
structure for exercising federal oversight over the fiscal affairs of the
territory by establishing an Oversight Board with broad powers of
budgetary and financial control, procedures for adjusting debts
accumulated by the Puerto Rican government and its instrumentalities,
and expedites approval of key energy and "critical projects" in Puerto
Rico.o 7 The Oversight Board consists of seven members appointed by
the President of the United States and one ex-officio member designated
by the Governor of Puerto Rico.' "The Oversight Board operates as an
entity within the Puerto Rican Government, and is given broad authority
over the Commonwealth and any of its instrumentalities that the Board
designates as 'covered' instrumentalities."I' Furthermore,
the Board is endowed with a variety of significant powers, including
the authority to develop, review, and approve territorial and
instrumentality fiscal plans and budgets; to enforce budget and fiscal
compliance; to seek judicial enforcement of its authority to carry out
its responsibilities under PROMIESA; and to intervene in any litigation
filed against the Commonwealth or its instrumentalities.110
Title M does not impair or limit the territory's power to control
itself or its instrumentalities and permits the operations of the
municipalities to continue functioning uninterrupted."' Thus,
government facilities will remain open, employees will continue to
receive regular wages and benefits, and government services will
continue to be provided." 2 To emerge from Title III, each debtor must
file a plan of adjustment that will provide for the classification and
adjustment of the debtor's debts.113
C.

CurrentStatus of Title III of PROMESA

Under Title III, Puerto Rico. is currently unraveling the $74 billion
debt owned by creditors including bondholders and pension plan
holders." 4 Untangling the web of securities sold by various agencies and
secured by numerous types of revenue funds from taxes to tolls has
107. AUsTIN, supra note 105, at 1, 6, 15.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2121
(2016); Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd., v. Garcia-Padilla, 217 F. Supp. 3d 508, 514
(D.P.R. 2016).
110. BrigadeLeveraged Cap. Structures, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 514 (citations omitted).
111. See Long, supra note 106, at 83.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Puerto Rico Debt Crisis:Making Sense of the Debacle, supra note 66.
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raised various issues with regard to the constitutionality by which the
securities were issued.' As Puerto Rico's municipalities move through
Title III, the Oversight Board is tasked with creating and implementing a
fiscal plan that will seek to reduce consolidated government spending,
boost revenue, and lead Puerto Rico into long-term fiscal stability.116
Simultaneously, the Oversight Board must coordinate the cooperation of
17
its major creditors and various debt related lawsuits.'
1. Types of Creditors
While the Commonwealth has a variety of creditors, the dominant
creditors are the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation
bondholders and general obligation bondholders. 1 s COFINA bonds are
non-recourse bonds that are paid solely from, and secured by the sales
and use tax.119 General obligation bond payments are not linked to one
specific revenue source and are guaranteed by the Island's
Constitution.120 Thus, COFINA and general obligation bondholders are
beginning to battle for the first claim on the Commonwealth's sales tax
revenue.12 1 About thirty percent of the Commonwealth's $74 billion
debt is owned by hedge funds. 122
Although big institutional investors and hedge funds own a
significant portion of the $74 billion of Puerto Rico's outstanding bonds,
"two-thirds of the debt is held by retail investors, either outright or in
one of the dozens of U.S.-based retail municipal-bond funds."12 3
Additionally, bond-insurance companies that guarantee a significant
portion of Puerto Rico's debt in the event of a default will also have a
major stake throughout the restructuring proceedings.124 The three
biggest bond-insurers are Ambac Financial Group Inc., Assured

115. Id.
116.

AUSTIN, supra note 105, at 11; see Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v.

Garcia-Padilla, 217 F. Supp. 3d 508, 514 (D.P.R. 2016).
117. Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 514.
118. Lex Claims, LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Board, 853 F.3d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 2017).
119. Id. at 551 n.4; Katherine Burton, Rebecca Spalding, & Michelle Kaske, Maria Made
Puerto Rico's Giant Debt Even Trickier for Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2017),

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-12/maria-made-puerto-rico-s-giant-debteven-trickier-for-hedge-funds.
120. Burton, Spalding, & Kaske, supra note 119.
121. Kelly, supra note 2.
122. See Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, supranote 66.
123. Abby Schultz, Puerto Rico's Debt Victims Aren't All Vulture Funds, BARRON'S
(Oct. 28, 2017), http://www.barrons.com/articles/puerto-ricos-debt-victims-arent-all-vulture-funds-

1509159296.
124.

See Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, supra note 66.
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Guaranty Municipal Corp., and National Public Finance Guarantee
Corp., a unit of MBIA Inc. 125
2. Fiscal Adjustment Plan
While a keystone to the PROMESA process is the development of a
five-year fiscal plan, the Oversight Board instead chose to develop a tenyear plan. 126 On March 13, 2017, the Oversight Board certified the tenyear fiscal plan for the Commonwealth's government. 127 The plan
reduces consolidated government spending by five percent, pension
costs by ten percent, and debt services by seventy-eight percent.12 8
The plan
aims to boost revenues with tax reforms, increase tax compliance and
increase fees and taxes; tighten government spending with a wage
freeze until 2020 and cut subsidies and operational expenditures;
extract economics in health care spending and pension plans; and
invest in infrastructure projects along with support from public/
private partnerships. 129
The fiscal plan projected a $100 million reduction in fiscal year
2018 health care spending by capping payment to health care providers
and decreasing pension costs by $83 million beginning in 2020.130
Revenue enhancements in the fiscal plan depend primarily on the
expansion of the reform of corporate taxes, extension of current sales tax
to Internet purchasers, increase in excise taxes on tobacco products, and
a ten percent increase in the cost of traffic fines.' 31
3. Debt Related Lawsuits
There are various debt related lawsuits that have arisen as a result
of Puerto Rico's bankruptcy proceedings. 13 2 General obligation
bondholders claim Puerto Rico's Constitution requires all sales-tax
money be used to pay them instead of COFINA bondholders.13 3 Hedge
funds and bond insurers are competing for any monetary amount the
government collects, including cash from rum taxes, vehicle fees, and

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id
Long, supra note 106, at 12.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, supra note 66.
Id.
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tolls.' 34 COFINA bond insurer, Ambac Financial Group, has sought to
overrule moratorium orders and legislation in effect since the end of
2015 that allow the government to "claw back" certain sources of
income (taxes, cigarette licenses, oil barrel fees, etc.) that guarantee the
payment of specific debt.135 In its request, Ambac is attempting to
prevent the government from appropriating sales and use tax funds that
guarantee the payment of COFINA debt.136
D.

HurricaneMaria'sDevastatingImpact

In the midst of its financial restructuring, on September 21, 2017,
Hurricane Maria slammed into Puerto Rico; plunging the Island into
darkness and forcing many of the 3.4 million citizens to confront life
without their homes, electricity, or gas. 13 7 The Category Four storm
wiped out the Island's power grid leaving the Island without power.1 38
For virtually three weeks following the storm, there was a near total
communication blackout. 139 Experts estimated that the hurricane
demolished 100,000 homes and buildings, and ninety percent of the
Island's infrastructure was deemed unsafe.' 40 Two months after the
storm, roughly 1520 people continued to live in shelters.141 Economic
losses are estimated to range between $30 billion to $95 billion after
Hurricane Maria wiped out the Island's power grid and left inhabitants
without running water and shortages of food and medicine. 142 The
hurricane has had far-reaching consequences on population health as
damaged infrastructure has isolated communities and left hospitals
without supplies, overcrowding, and poor sanitation.' 43 While the
official death toll was initially certified as sixty-four, mounting evidence
indicates that Puerto Rico vastly undercounted the number of deaths and
that the total may actually be closer to 1052.1'
134. Id.
135. Long, supra note 106, at 84.
136. Id.
137. Lluveras, supra note 1.
138. Burton, Spalding, & Kaske, supra note 119.
139. Holmes, supra note 5.
140. Id.
141. Lydia O'Connor, 7 Numbers that Explain How Puerto Rico Is Still Suffering,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2017, 7:30 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/puerto-ricomaria-by-the-numbers us_5al34c85e4b0c335e996b89d.
142. Burton, Spalding, & Kaske, supra note 119.
143. Jennifer Sciubba & Jeremy Youde, Puerto Rico's Troubles Are Far from Over. The
Population's Health Is at Risk., WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/13/puerto-ricos-troubles-are-far-from-over-the-populations-healthis-at-risk/?utmterm-.0el90bcdc43f.
144.

Patricia Mazzei, Puerto Rico Orders Review and Recount of Hurricane Deaths, N.Y.
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Businesses continue to struggle even weeks after the storm hit the
Island. 145 The absence of power and Internet has crippled local
commerce, which has been forced to rely on paper and cash in the
absence of taking customer credit cards. 14 6 Similarly, hotels and local
car-rental agencies have turned to written records to keep track
of bookings. 14 7
Moody's September Analytics Report has estimated that between
$20 billion to $40 billion could be lost in productivity output due to
storm related disruptions. 148 Most Puerto Rican bonds have collapsed in
price since the storm. 14 9 For example, Puerto Rico's most recent

offering, a $3.5 billion general-obligation bond due in July 2035 with an
eight percent coupon, is trading for less than twenty-eight cents on the
dollar.150 Additionally, COFINA bonds are trading for approximately
forty cents on the dollar."' As of October 11, 2017, Moody's Investor
Services downgraded the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's general
obligation bonds from "Caa3" to "Ca," describing the storm's overall
economic impact after the economic and revenue disruptions as a
"substantial negative that has weakened the Commonwealth's ability to
repay creditors." 5

2

1. Government Contracts
As Puerto Rico continues to rebuild, the Puerto Rican government
has come under immense criticism regarding the process by which
contracts have been awarded. On September 26, 2017, Puerto Rico's
utility company, PREPA, awarded a $300 million contract to Whitefish
Energy to rebuild the Island's electrical grid.1 3 Whitefish Energy is a
two-year-old Montana-based company that had only two employees at
the time that it was awarded the contract. 15 4 Critics have questioned the
legitimacy of the contract that was granted without a public bid process

TIMEs (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-deathtoll-review.html.
145. Daniela Hernandez & Arian Campo-Flores, Puerto Rico's Economy Is Back to Basics,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2017, at A3.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Schultz, supra note 123.
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Rating Action: Moody's Downgrades Puerto Rico GOs, COFINA and Other Debt After
HurricaneMaria; Outlook Negative, supranote 4.
153. Richard P6rez-Peia, 'Significant Concerns' Cited over Puerto Rico Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2017, at A13.
154. Id
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to a company with little experience of work on such a scale."ss
Furthermore, under the contract, PREPA agreed to pay electrical
lineman workers $319 per hour; the average salary in Puerto Rico for
such work is $19 per hour. 5
On October 29, 2017, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo A.
Rossell6, asked the governing board of PREPA to immediately cancel its
contract with Whitefish Energy. 15 7 The Governor expressed significant
concerns about how Whitefish obtained the contract, stating "the
contract had become a 'distraction' and that attention had to be
refocused on restoring service.""5 s The Governor's statement came two
days after the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA")
warned that it might refuse to cover any costs if the contract between
Whitefish and PREPA was found to be improper.159
PREPA's CEO, Ricardo Ramos, gave various contradicting
explanations for his decision to choose Whitefish over mutual aid
agreements with other utility companies, which are customary after
disaster.160 For example, Mr. Ramos stated that
he preferred Whitefish because he expected the United States Army
Corps of Engineers to pay the company, which meant the bankrupt
utility would not have to front any of the money for repairs.
Under mutual aid agreements, [PREPA] would have to pay for the
work and then seek reimbursement from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency.161

Later, however, Ramos told legislators "he went with the private
company because he did not have the resources to find lodging for
workers borrowed from other utilities" although "emails released [in
November] by the House Committee on Natural Resources show that
Whitefish workers could not find housing, either."' 62 Furthermore,
although Ramos has contended that he has not received any kickbacks
for this contract, he acknowledged that "the company had long been rife
with political patronage, and that up to half of the employees were the
family members of politicians."1 63 Following this widespread criticism,
15 5.

Id.
156. Frances Robles, PuertoRico's Power ChiefSteps Down in Scandal, N.Y. TmiMEs, Nov. 18,
2017, at All.
157. Frances Robles & Deborah Acosta, Puerto Rico Cancels Contract with Small Montana
Firm to Rebuild Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2017, at A10.
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Robles, supra note 156.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id
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Ramos resigned on November 17, 2017." About "two months after the
storm, the grid is generating power at forty-five percent of capacity."16 1
Mr. Ramos's resignation highlights the lack of transparency of
PREPA and that its policies have helped grow Puerto Rico's staggering
amount of debt. 16 6 An example of the power authority's complex and
paradoxical role in the economy in Puerto Rico is PREPA's free
electrical power setup. 16 7 The power authority provides free power to
government-owned enterprises, many for-profit businesses, and all of
Puerto Rico's seventy-eight municipalities.16 1 In exchange for free
electricity, PREPA pays no property taxes or licensing fees for various
cities.16 1 Supporters believe the free electricity arrangement is "so tightly
woven into the fabric of society that unwinding it would have vast
ramifications and, some say, only worsen the plight of the people who
live [there] ."17o Eduardo Bhatia, the President of the Puerto Rico Senate
remarked, "If the towns don't get free energy, they're going to have to
pay for it by increasing their property taxes or something, so the people
will end up paying." 17 1 In 2014, analysts found that cities throughout
Puerto Rico "had received $420 million worth of free electricity that
they should have paid for." 72 Furthermore, "288 governmental bodies
on the Island were delinquent in their power payments by
$300 million."173
2. Federal Aid
On September 21, 2017, FEMA announced that federal disaster
assistance has been made available to Puerto Rico to supplement the

164. Id.
165. Frances Robles, C.E.O. of Puerto Rico Power Authority Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/us/prepa-ceo-resigns-puerto-rico.html.
166. See Robles, supra note 156.
167. See Mary Williams Walsh, How Free Electricity Helped Dig $9 Billion Hole in Puerto
Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2016, at Al.
168. Id at B4. The concept of free electricity dates back to 1941 when the utility company was
first established by Rexford Tugwell, a member of Franklin D. Roosevelt's brain trust. Id. Tugwell
"contended that for electricity to benefit the people, it had to be owned by the people, and he created
[PREPA] by nationalizing the handful of private electric companies then on the island." Id. The free
electricity was intended to make up for lost tax revenue in that "the value of free power was
supposed to match the forgone taxes, and if the city took more, they were supposed to pay for it."
Id.
169. Robles, supra note 156.
170. See Walsh, supranote 167, at B4.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Among the governmental bodies delinquent in payments included public schools,
hospitals, low-income housing projects, a commuter train, the Island's water and sewage system,
and its highway authority, which operates traffic signals, toll plazas, and highway lighting. Id.
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recovery efforts affected by the hurricane.174 The federal funding is
available to affected individuals in specific cities, eligible local
governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations on a costsharing basis for emergency work in all seventy-eight municipalities.17 5
On October 11, 2017, the House of Representatives voted to approve
spending of $36.5 billion in disaster aid for Puerto Rico in a new
package of funds that also included money to combat the wildfires on
the West Coast of the mainland United States. 17 6 Furthermore, the
governments of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands would have access to
$4.9 billion in special loans that will allow them to continue to pay
employees and vendors. 77

Beyond the disruption of the immediate aftermath of the storm, the
potential long-term repercussions may be somewhat mixed, however. 178
On one hand, a massive exodus of Puerto Ricans choosing to relocate to
the United States, rather than rebuilding on the Island, will further erode
Puerto Rico's economic base that had already been readily declining. 179
"On the other, an infusion of federal funds could spur the economic
growth and development of infrastructure" that has otherwise eluded the
Island.so Given the lack of taxes collected by the Puerto Rican
government, major infrastructure projects, including the outdated
electrical grid, have been put off.'"' The infusion of new funds will
provide for major infrastructure renovations that the Island has never
been able to accomplish on its own.' 82 For example, energy experts have
stated that the rebuilding effort "offers a unique opportunity to outfit
the Island with the electric grid of the future: a state-of-the-art

174. Press Release, FEMA, President Donald J. Trump Approves Major Disaster Declaration
for Puerto Rico (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/21/president-donaldj-trump-approves-major-disaster-declaration-puerto-rico.
175. Id.
176. Mike DeBonis, House Approves $36 Billion in DisasterAid, Responding to Wildfires and
Puerto Rico

Crisis,

WASH.

POST

(Oct.

12,

2017),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/

news/powerpost/wp/2017/10/12/house-approves-36-billion-in-disaster-aid-responding-to-wildfiresand-puerto-rico-crisis/?utmterm=.25e71714c006.
177. Id
178. Rating Action: Moody's Downgrades Puerto Rico GOs, COFINA and Other Debt After
HurricaneMaria; Outlook Negative, supra note 4.
179. Id.; see Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico: Hurricane Maria Hammers an Economy that

Can't Take Much More, CNN: MONEY (Sept. 20, 2017, 11:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/
2017/09/20/news/economy/puerto-rico-hurricane-marialindex.html.
180. Rating Action: Moody's DowngradesPuerto Rico GOs, COFINA and Other Debt After
HurricaneMaria; Outlook Negative, supra note 4.

181. Justin Worland, Puerto Rico's DevastatedElectric Grid Could Be a Big Opportunityfor
Renewable Energy, TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), http://time.com/4963240/hurricane-maria-puerto-ricoelectrical-grid.
182. See id.
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system built from scratch using renewable energy sources like wind
and solar, which would be cheaper to operate and would respond
better to the next hurricane.""
On November 13, 2017, Puerto Rico's Governor appeared before
the Senate and the House to ask the federal government for an additional
$94 billion in disaster funds. 18 4 The request, however, did not include a
breakdown of how the funds would be used."8 ' Specifically, Mr.
Rossell6 requested $15 billion for health care ("without specifying what
medical facilities needed to be fixed"), $8.4 billion for schools ("without
noting what damages the schools had incurred") and $17.7 billion
pertaining to the restoration of the power-grid.186 Legislators, however,
remain skeptical of the Island's ability and competence to handle such a
massive influx of funds in light of how PREPA and the governor
handled the Whitefish contract. 18 7 While some legislators sought
answers with regard to this contract, others questioned why Puerto Rico
should receive any help at all from the U.S. government when Puerto
Ricans are exempt from most federal income taxes." Considering the
Oversight Board's lack of control to manage the funds given to the
Puerto Rican government, there remain legitimate concerns as to
whether leaders in Puerto Rico will be fiscally competent
and transparent in their handling of the humanitarian contracts and
fiscal restructuring.189
IV.

THE ROAD TO A FISCAL RECOVERY

As Puerto Rico attempts to weather the compounding effects of the
Commonwealth's fiscal and humanitarian disasters, it is unclear what
shape a solution will take either through creditor negations or debt
forgiveness. 190 Part of the relief may likely come in the form of a "rollup," which is often common in major bankruptcy cases.' 9 A roll-up in
bankruptcy allows for a debtor struggling to obtain financing, to fund its
183. Id.
184. Andr6s L. C6rdova, Two Months Later: Puerto Rico Doesn't Have Power, Education or
Economy Running Again, HILL (Nov. 20, 2017, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/energyenvironment/36121 1-two-months-later-puerto-rico-doesnt-have-power-education-or.
185. Frances Robles, After Utility Deal Scandal, Puerto Rico Asks for $94 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2017, at All.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Long, supra note 106, at 80.
190. Mary Williams Walsh, Lenders Offer Some Help in Turning Lights Back On, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2017, at A20.
191. Id
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operations by asking pre-petition lenders to inject money into the estate
by offering a post-petition facility that effectively pays off or "rolls-up"
a pre-petition debt. 192 In exchange, the pre-petition lender will provide a
new loan to the debtor.193 The new roll-up loan is given an upgraded
priority status by transforming the existing lenders' pre-petition claims
into a post-petition administrative expense; a status that has preferential
treatment on the priority totem pole.1 94 The rationale behind a roll-up is
that when a debtor has no other reasonable prospect of financing its
business operations, the lender would have a better chance of getting
repaid if the debtor is able to continue its business rather than if the
debtor was forced to cease operations.1 95 In Puerto Rico, for example, a
group of bondholders that includes mutual and hedge funds have offered
to lend Puerto Rico "$1 billion to pay for urgent repairs and to cancel
$150 million of the power company's outstanding debt in the
process."1 96 The bondholder's loan would take priority over some of
Puerto Rico's other debts and would offset some losses the bondholders
may face if the original debt is not paid in full. 197 As such,
[u]nder the terms of the $1 billion loan being offered by bondholders,
Puerto Rico would not have to make principal or interest payments for
two years. During that time, the interest would accumulate at a variable
rate starting at about five and a half percent and following market rates
up or down.198

The $150 million roll-up would exchange $1 billion of outstanding
defaulted bonds for new, viable bonds with a face value of
$850 million."
Others have called upon the federal government to wipe out the
debt completely.20 0 In a statement to Fox News, President Trump hinted
that Puerto Rico's crippling debt ought to be forgiven.201 White House
budget director Mick Mulvaney has since dialed back the President's
192. David Griffiths, Roll-up, Roll-up, ReadAll About It!, WEL BANKR. BLOG (Oct. 6, 2010),
https:/Ibusiness-finance-restructuring.weil.com/dip-financing/roll-up-roll-up-read-all-about-it.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Walsh, supra note 190.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Nathan Bomey, 6 Reasons Why Puerto Rico Slid into Financial Crisis, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/10/04/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-bankruptcy-donaldtrump/731091001 (last updated Oct. 4, 2017).
201. Victor Morton, Puerto Rico's $70 Billion Debt Will Have to Be Wiped out, Trump Says,
WASH. TIMEs (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/3/puerto-ricos-debtwill-have-be-wiped-out-trump-say.
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statement and stated that Trump's comments should not be taken
literally.2 02 Still, many believe that a total debt forgiveness for Puerto
Rico may be a viable alternative to the debt restructuring in light of the
destruction wreaked by Hurricane Maria.203 As previously mentioned,
prior to the storm, the Oversight Board developed a plan to wipe out
seventy-nine percent of the annual debt payments.2 " Since Hurricane
Maria's landing on Puerto Rico, the prices of bonds have dropped
dramatically.20 5 Some believe that this drop in bond prices may
ultimately help Puerto Rico's path out of bankruptcy.2 06 Following this
drop in prices, "investors have unloaded the Island's bonds at the fastest
pace in three years, pushing prices to one new low after another."20 7
Still, an elimination of debt will not solve the longstanding
economic instability and dependence that has forced Puerto Rico into
this economic predicament in the first place.208 Puerto Rico must focus
on a solution that affords the Commonwealth long-term fiscal stability
and enables the Island's economic independence.2 09 Rather than
depending on tax breaks to attract foreign corporations, Puerto Rico's
relief strategy should focus on growing local businesses, universities,
and infrastructure.210 Subpart A discusses how Congress should alter
PROMESA to give the Oversight Board more authority to supervise the
control regarding the fiscal management of the Island and the ongoing
humanitarian relief.211 Following these amendments, Subpart B
discusses how relief should be grounded in long-term initiatives that
construct an autonomous economy.212 By focusing on initiatives, which
promote the health of its insular and local economy, Puerto Rico may be
able to relieve itself of the codependency that has historically plagued
the Island.213
202. Justin Sink & Jennifer Epstein, No US. Bailoutfor PuertoRican Debt, Trump's Budget
Chief Says, BLOOMBERG POL., https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-04/tnumpsuggests-puerto-rico-s-debt-may-need-to-be-wiped-out (last updated Oct. 4, 2017).
203.

Kate Aronoff, Puerto Rico Is on Track for HistoricDebt Forgiveness-Unless Wall Street

Gets Its Way, INTERCEPT (Oct. 4, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/04/puerto-ricodebt-forgiveness-hurricane-maria.
204. Id.
205. Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico Bond-Trading Blitz Could Ease Path from Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2017, 11:04 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-1116/puerto-rico-bond-trading-blitz-seen-easing-path-from-bankuptcy.
206. Id.
207. Id
208. Allen & Pefialoza, supra note 60.
209. See infra PartIV.
210. See infra Part IV.B.
211. See infra PartIVA.
212. See infra PartIV.B.
213. See infra PartIV.
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Amendments to PROMESA to Give the OversightBoard
Supervisory Powers

Some critics believe that PROMESA is hampering more than
helping the storm recovery efforts, leading some to call for amendments
to the legislation.214 While PROMESA places Puerto Rico under the
Oversight Board and subjects its debt to a court-supervised restructuring,
the legislation greatly limits the authority that the bankruptcy judges and
other federal officials can exert over the insolvent local governments.2 15
After the public outcry regarding PREPA's Whitefish contract, many
called upon the Oversight Board to cancel the contract and remove the
PREPA CEO. 2 16 However, after hearing such arguments from
bondholders, Judge Laura Taylor Swain ruled that the Oversight Board
had no legal authority to install new leadership at the power company.217
Furthermore, Judge Swain added that the Board had no authority to
impose austerity measures on Puerto Rico, even if it thought steps taken
by Governor Ricardo Rossell6 did not go far enough.2 18 While many
Puerto Ricans blamed the Governor for failing to fix the electrical grid
and awarding the contract to Whitefish, the Governor appeared
emboldened by Judge Swain's restriction of the Oversight Board and
attested that the Oversight Board had authority in just three areas:
representing Puerto Rico in the restructuring proceedings; ensuring that
its budget is balanced; and helping the Island regain its ability to tap the
public credit markets.
Although Congress may tie specific strings to the money it affords
Puerto Rico, many believe that the undercurrent of corruption and
inefficiency of Puerto Rican politicians is what created the fiscal crisis in
the first place.22 0 Particularly in light of the questionable contracting
practices of PREPA, PROMESA should be amended in order to

214. Mary Williams Walsh, Crisis Law Snags Puerto Rico Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2017, at Bl, B5.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Puerto Rico has a historical practice of misrepresenting its financial condition whether
by falsifying documents or failing to provide accurate budget numbers. Long, supra note 106, at 80.
The Island's government has routinely been unable or unwilling to provide Congress with accurate
numbers that explain the Island's financial needs and this lack of transparency has only exacerbated
the Island's financial woes. Mary Williams Walsh, A Hurdle to Transparency,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2015, at BI, B4.
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strengthen the Oversight Board's authority and congressional oversight
in the recovery process. 22 1 Accordingly, the Oversight Board should be
tasked with more fiduciary and administrative control over the money,
such as in the situation with PREPA.22 2 While the Oversight Board has
some budgetary and financial control, and approval of key energy and
"critical projects," the role of the Board in practicality, is substantially
limited. 22 3 One way to implement more control to the Oversight Board,
without risking Puerto Rico's internal sovereignty, would be to appoint
more elected officials to the Board. 224 By including the Governor of
Puerto Rico, the heads of major agencies, and other representatives, the
Oversight Board would consist of both representatives and experts who
would be able to provide the officials with the knowledge and
experience necessary to provide competent advice regarding the longterm plans of Puerto Rico. 225 After adding specific legislators and
government representatives, the Oversight Board should be allotted the
authority to approve or reject the signing of contracts, the ability to
impose austerity measures, and remove government appointees for
cause. 226 Tasking the Oversight Board with more responsibility would
provide a transparent mechanism that can make sure that Puerto Rico is
utilizing U.S. funds in the best interest of all Puerto Ricans and crafting
a legitimate and realistic plan for the future economic standing of
Puerto Rico. 2 27

The concept of granting the Oversight Board with more authority
may be likened to the financial troubles- experienced by Washington,
D.C. in the 1990s. 22 8 On April 7, 1995, Congress approved legislation to
create a financial control board for the District of Columbia. 22 9 The fivemember financial control board was appointed by President Clinton and
was granted vast authority over municipal spending, financial planning,

221.

Andr6s L. C6rdova, We Need to Reevaluate Puerto Rico's TerritoryStatus as We Rebuild,

HILL (Nov. 7, 2017, 12:20 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/359109-we-need-toreevaluate-puerto-ricos-territory-status-as-we-rebuild.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Walsh, supranote 214, at B5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

227.
228.

See A Hurdle to Transparency, supranote 220.
AUSTIN, supra note 105, at 3; Michael Janofsky, Congress Creates Board to Oversee

Washington, D.C., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/us/congresscreates-board-to-oversee-washington-dc.html.
229. Janofsky, supra note 228.
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borrowing, hiring, and contracts.2 30 Similar to the Oversight Board in
Puerto Rico, the control board was tasked with
ensur[ing] that the District efficiently and effectively deliver services
to its residents; enhance the District's timely payments of its debts;
increase the city's access to capital markets; assure the city's long-term
economic vitality and operational efficiency; and repair and foster a
better relationship between the District and the Federal Government. 231
However, to ensure such goals were achieved, Congress vested the
control board with broad powers traditionally reserved for the city
government.232 These powers included the authority to approve or reject
the city's annual budget, its financial plan, and any attempts to spend or
borrow in the city's name, and to review all future and existing
contracts.233 Furthermore, all District spending was to be routed through
the control board. 2 34 The board also was expected to approve the
Mayor's appointments to key government positions, including the Chief
Financial Officer, have the authority to remove such appointees for
cause, and, in extraordinary circumstances, disapprove of District laws
passed by the City Council. 235 Following the implementation of this law,
the District of Columbia's fiscal health vastly improved as the economic
improvements resulted in a balanced budget, investment-grade credit
rating, and a larger economy. 23 6

The situation plaguing Puerto Rico is similar to that faced by
Washington, D.C. in that its "hybrid municipal entity" impacted its long
term financial viability because while "it lacked revenue support from a
state government," it "was forced by necessity to provide its residents
services normally funded by a state." 237 By affording the Oversight
Board similar control, the Board will be able to implement long-term
practices to encourage fiscal discipline. 23 8 After affording the Board
such responsibility, the Board should look to restrain spending, control
expenditures through budget management tools, and improve revenue
collection, capacity, and estimation.239 Furthermore, by allowing the

230. Id.
231. DC APPLESEED & OUR NATION'S CAPITAL, BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE
WORLD 82 (2008) [hereinafter BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE WORLD].

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id at 107.
Id. at 83-85.
See id. at 83-85, 107.
See id at 113-15.
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Board the power to approve contracts, the Board will be able to
ensure that similar problems to the Whitefish Energy contract do not
occur again. 240
B.

Amendments to Puerto Rico's Constitution

Puerto Rico's financial troubles are symptomatic of irresponsible
budgeting, issuing bonds beyond the debt ceilings, and oppressive
spending.2 41 Puerto Rico's economy has historically been focused on tax
schemes, like those that expired in 2006, which promote artificial
stability. 242 Following the Congressional amendments to PROMESA,
Puerto Rico and the Oversight Board should: (1) amend the Puerto Rican
Constitution to include a debt ceiling that limits the debt capacity to
Puerto Rico's total revenue rather than "total resources"; (2) enhance tax
collection problems through increased efficiency systems; and (3)
implement new tax incentives that will spur local business growth in
companion with initiatives dedicated towards foreign corporate
development. 2 43 The combination of these initiatives will provide a
framework that can incentivize responsible long-term planning based on
realistic projections. 24 Incentivizing local businesses will encourage
Puerto Rican workers to enter the workforce, which will grow the
economic base. 2 45 Encouraging local business growth will in turn
generate more revenue through sales and income taxes.246 When the
collection of such taxes are properly accounted for, the Puerto Rican
government will be afforded a better picture of the actual revenue
generated, which will provide a better picture for the amount of debt the
247
When the Oversight Board is given direct
government can issue.
supervisory powers over the financial affairs of its municipalities with
respect to the budget, revenue calculation, and cash management,
Puerto Ricans, U.S. representatives, and bondholders can have the

240.
241.
242.

See Walsh, supra note 214, at B5.
See supra Part II.
Greenberg & Ekins, supra note 25.

243.

JOFFE & MARTINEZ, supra note 41, at 10; see BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE

WORLD supra note 231, at 114-15; Cate Long, Decades of Debt: The Puerto Rico Fiscal
Crisis, CITY & SLATE (Oct. 22, 2015), http://cityandstateny.com/articles/somos/road-to-somascoverage/decades-of-debt-the-puerto-rico-fiscal-crisis.html.
244.

See BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE WORLD, supra note 231, at 115-16.

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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assurance that government functions are being administered with
the requisite transparency and competency necessary to run a
functioning government.24 8
Additionally, while foreign corporate tax initiatives are important,
tax incentives should focus on the growth of Puerto Rico's economy,
independent of foreign corporations. 24 9 Although most of Puerto Rico's
current tax incentives can be used by local companies, many of the
incentives were designed to entice outside corporations to do business in
Puerto Rico.250 Practically, local startups cannot take advantage of the
incentives because they require the company to have ongoing taxable
revenue.2 5' Instead, incentives should focus on encouraging
entrepreneurial spirit whether by building infrastructure or encouraging
enrollment in local universities.252 A way of encouraging business
growth of foreign corporations, while also growing Puerto Rico's insular
economy, could be to identify specific services that big companies may
look to outsource from Puerto Rico. 253
V.

CONCLUSION

There is no easy solution for Puerto Rico.254 Instead, Puerto Rico's
path toward sovereign solvency will be lengthy, complex, and require
various changes to practices that the government has historically rested
upon.255 Because its debt crisis derives from a multitude of sources,
Puerto Rico is in need of viable long-term solutions that can reshape the
various practices and loopholes that have resulted in the rapid
accumulation of debt.256 While decades of questionable governmental
procedures may have encouraged the overwhelming municipal debt,
Hurricane Maria further upended the Island's delicate future
financial plan. 257

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
See

Long, supra note 243.
Brown, supranote 30.

Long, supranote 243.

Long, supranote 106, at 80; Walsh, supra note 220, at B4.
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The devastation left behind by Hurricane Maria has created a new
reality for Puerto Rican municipalities and creditors in which they must
reconcile the parallel economic and humanitarian disasters. 258 Although
significant amounts of federal aid and private insurance proceeds will be
available to help rebuild Puerto Rico's shattered infrastructure, it is
unlikely that the Commonwealth will be able to cover any shortfalls.25 9
The ongoing crisis in Puerto Rico may have serious repercussions if the
Title III restructuring proceedings do not succeed in relieving the
Commonwealth's crushing debt and providing a realistic fiscal roadmap
for the years to come.26 0 Given the significance of U.S. based investor
funds in Puerto Rico's debt, a restructuring failure will have
reverberating effects on the U.S. economy, as well as Puerto Rico's
ability to rebuild after the crushing effects of Hurricane Maria.26 1
In order to escape the financial and humanitarian crises plaguing
the Island, Puerto Rico must alter the status quo that encouraged
unreasonable spending and irresponsible budgeting.262 Puerto Rico must
leverage this opportunity to restructure its debts under PROMESA to
form long standing solutions that will allow its economy to thrive
independent of corporate entities.26 3 Furthermore, by affording the
Oversight Board strong and independent control over the Island's
finances, similar to Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico may be able to regain
control of its bloated budget and get its fiscal affairs back on track. 26
Fortunately, Puerto Rico has a culture of resilience.2 65 Puerto Rican
citizens continue to remain steadfast as they face the daunting tasks of
rebuilding their homes, businesses, and livelihoods.2 66 No matter the
path that a long-term financial solution will take, it can be sure that
"Puerto Rico will not only survive this. It will bloom once again." 26 7 In
the words of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, "[W]e are united in the firm
belief that Puerto Rico will persevere. The incredible spirit and strength
of the Puerto Rican people is unbreakable. Our island has faced
258.

Nick

Brown,

Hurricane Chimges the

Game for Puerto Rico Bond Investors,

REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertoricorestructuring/hurricane-changes-the-game-for-puerto-rico-bond-investors-idUSItBN1DL2SN.
259. See Worland, supra note 181.
260. See Schutlz, supra note 123.
261. Id.
262. Long, supra note 106, at 80.
263. See Brown, supra note 30.
264.

BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE WORLD, supra note 231, at 114-15.

265.

See Holmes, supra note 5.

266.

Lluveras, supra note 1.

267. Id.; see Cristian Farias, Sonia Sotomayor's Message ofHope to PuertoRico: 'You Are Not
Alone', N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 27, 2017, 9:48 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/09/soniasotomayors-message-of-hope-to-puerto-rico.html.
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innumerable challenges throughout the centuries. However, each and
every time, Puerto Rico has emerged stronger. And we will do
so again." 268
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* J.D. Candidate 2018, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University; B.A., in
Mass Communication, 2014, University of Delaware. I would like to first thank my parents,
Raymond and Monica Zorovich. Your continued love and support means more than you will ever
know. A special thank you to my grandmother Maryanne Zorovich and great-aunt Carol Filardi for
their encouragement and support of all my endeavors. A huge thank you to the Volume 46
Managing Board-Jonathan DeMars, Tessa Patti, and Mindy Hollander-as well as Kyle Gruder,
Taylor Cary, and Alexis Fallon whose hard work and dedication has ensured the continued success
of the Hofstra Law Review. I would also like to thank my amazing law school friends who have
been by my side every step of the way. Finally, I would like to say a special mention to my
grandfather Raymond Zorovich, Sr. Thank you for inspiring me to work hard, be relentless, and
follow my dreams. I miss you and carry you with me every day.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 11

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss3/11

30

